From Class Solidarity to Revolution: The Radicalization of Arsenal Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire by Akın Sefer
IRSH 58 (2013), pp. 395–428 doi:10.1017/S0020859013000485
r 2013 Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
From Class Solidarity to Revolution: The
Radicalization of Arsenal Workers in the Late
Ottoman Empire*
A K I N S E F E R
Department of History, Northeastern University
360 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA 02115, USA
E-mail: sefer.a@husky.neu.edu
ABSTRACT: This article introduces a bottom-up perspective to the history of the
Revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire by focusing on the experiences of
workers in the Imperial Naval Arsenal (Tersaˆne-i Aˆmire) in Istanbul. Drawing
mainly on primary documents, the article explores, from a class-formation per-
spective, the struggles and relations of Arsenal workers from the second half of the
nineteenth century until the revolution. The Arsenal workers’ involvement in the
revolution was rooted in their class solidarity, which was revealed in a number of
ways throughout this period. The workers’ immediate embrace of the revolution
was spurred by their radicalization against the state; such radicalization stemmed
from the state’s failure to solve the workers’ persistent economic problems, and its
attempts to discharge them and replace them with military labor. The case of the
Arsenal workers thus points to the role of working-class discontent in the history
of the revolution, a dimension that has thus far been only minimally addressed in
Ottoman historiography.
INTRODUCTION
The Revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire has long been char-
acterized by the central role of organized officers in the army, who forced
Sultan Abdulhamid II to reinstitute the Constitution and re-open the
Parliament in July 1908. Popular participation in the revolution, however,
is rarely mentioned, and such discussions tend to be restricted almost
exclusively to the rebellions in various parts of Anatolia between
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the anonymous referees and the Editorial Committee of the IRSH for their feedback, and to
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1905–1907 that remain both controversial and insufficiently studied.1
Recent labor history has seen significant attempts to illuminate, from a
working-class perspective, especially the aftermath of the revolution,
which was itself marked by various forms of labor unrest.2 However, an
analytical class-perspective to the development of this unrest remains
largely absent from the historical narrative. Indeed, the latter is still
dominated by the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress
(or ‘‘Young Turks’’ in general), who led and directed the rebellion in
Macedonia, which precipitated the ‘‘Declaration of Liberty’’ (I˙laˆn-ı Hu¨rriyet)
on 23 July 1908.3
The most important reason for this silence, even among social/labor
historians, is likely the implicit acceptance of the two-fold view that the
revolution was prepared by the Young Turks – who were not, nor
endeavored to be, a ‘‘popular movement’’4 – and that direct linkage
between the Young Turks and the workers must be shown in order to
introduce the working classes into the narrative. Yet this exclusive con-
centration on the agency of the Young Turks does not explain why the
Ottoman workers were so quick to embrace the Declaration of Liberty by
immediately translating it into massive celebrations, widespread strikes,
boycotts, and a blossoming of myriad political and non-political parties,
unions, organizations, independent periodicals, and publications. If the
Young Turks were not a popular movement, and if, prior to the revolution,
there were only limited links between them and the working classes,
then how should we explain the workers’ massive involvement in the
1. For different views on the role of Committee of Union and Progress in these uprisings, see
Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (Istanbul, 1996), pp. 35–96, and M. S- u¨kru¨ Haniog˘lu, Preparation
for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (New York [etc.], 2001), pp. 91–124.
2. Yavuz Selim Karakıs-la, ‘‘Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘u’nda 1908 Grevleri’’, Toplum ve Bilim,
78 (1998), pp. 187–209; Y. Dog˘an C¸etinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu: Bir Toplumsal
Hareketin Analizi (Istanbul, 2004). Two recent investigations into Ottoman labor history that
focus on the experiences of tobacco workers in this era are Can Nacar, ‘‘Tobacco Workers in
Late Ottoman Empire: Fragmentation, Conflict and Collective Struggle’’ (Ph.D. Binghamton
University, 2010) and E. Tutku Vardag˘lı, ‘‘Tobacco Labor Politics in the Province of
Thessaloniki: Cross-Communal and Cross-Gender Relations’’ (Ph.D. Bogazici University,
2011.)
3. In fact, the point was highlighted almost three decades ago in a number of articles by Donald
Quataert, who found in his research that ‘‘the revolution stemmed from the dislocations
brought on by rising European economic penetration of Ottoman society and its economy’’; D.
Quataert, ‘‘Machine-Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia,
1860–1908’’, Journal of Social History, 19 (1986), pp. 473–489, 483. See also his Workers, Pea-
sants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul, 1993), esp. pp. 42–62, and Social
Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1983). For a recent
criticism of the dominant CUP-centric approach to the revolution, see Y. Dog˘an C¸etinkaya,
‘‘1908 Devrimi ve Toplumsal Seferberlik’’, in Ferdan Ergut (ed.) II. Mes-rutiyet’i Yeniden
Du¨s-u¨nmek, (Istanbul, 2010), pp. 13–27.
4. Haniog˘lu, Preparation for a Revolution, p. 6.
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revolutionary festival following 23 July? In order to understand this
unusual phenomenon in Ottoman history, we must first historicize the
revolution from a bottom-up perspective.
The Declaration of Liberty was immediately embraced by the working
classes of Ottoman society, who launched a wave of massive strikes a
week after the Declaration was announced. The workers’ quick and
collective response in adopting the revolution and actively seizing this
opportunity to promote their own cause can be effectively understood
only by examining previous traces of the workers’ collective conscious-
ness and their radicalization against the government throughout the
preceding decades. By the eve of the revolution, the workers had already
formed a collective solidarity through their struggles and this, in fact, was
what enabled them immediately to put their mark on the revolution.
The history of struggles between the state and the workers in the
Imperial Naval Arsenal (Tersaˆne-i Aˆmire) in Istanbul affords a useful case
study for presenting how this solidarity formed along class lines and how
it affected the workers’ response to the Declaration of Liberty. Despite
the heterogeneity of their backgrounds (that is, places of origin, skills,
wages, and workplaces), and the absence of institutional settings (for
example, guilds and unions) that could have facilitated their engagement
with each other, the Arsenal workers managed to mobilize their shared
experiences and cultural practices on behalf of their class solidarity. In
other words, the workers’ collective solidarity, which had emerged during
the decades before the revolution, is crucial in explaining the continuity of
their struggles in the periods before and after the Declaration and their
immediate participation in the revolution.
The term ‘‘class solidarity’’ is not used here merely for rhetorical
purposes. Examining the experiences and relations of Arsenal workers in
a historical process will illustrate that these experiences and relations
evidenced class patterns. As E.P. Thompson explains in his seminal work,
understanding these patterns is only possible by surveying them over
‘‘an adequate period of social change’’.5 The history of the workers of the
Imperial Arsenal provides ample evidence of this class-formation process.
Although this article concentrates mostly (but not exclusively) on the
economic dimension of the process – primarily owing to reliance on state
documents which generally concerned wage problems – it also recognizes
the necessity of further research into other (i.e. ethno-religious) dimensions.6
5. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1966), p. 11.
6. A critical problem in studying the Ottoman working classes, which has been discussed by
other labor historians as well, unfortunately also presents itself here. In exploring the lives of
working-class people, the necessary reliance on state documents inevitably limits the scope of
their actions into a ‘‘resistance-against-the-state’’ narrative. In such readings, these people could
become a ‘‘subject’’ of these governmental correspondences only when they posed ‘‘threats’’ or
Radicalization of Arsenal Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire 397
Thus, focusing exclusively on one of the most active working-class
communities in the late Ottoman Empire, this study also aims to engage
the historiography of Ottoman labor, particularly by presenting ways in
which the process of class formation functioned in Ottoman history, and
discussing the central role of workers in the history of the Ottoman
Revolution of 1908.
THE IMPERIAL NAVAL ARSENAL AND ITS WORKERS
The Imperial Naval Arsenal of the Ottoman Empire, located in Istanbul,
underwent a modernization process throughout the nineteenth century;
by the 1870s it had become a major industrial complex, with several large-
scale workshops and various small factories.7 The Arsenal was a site not
only for the construction and maintenance of naval ships, but also for
production of various manufactured goods, ranging from smelted iron to
weapons. Thousands of soldiers, officers, and civil servants worked in the
facilities; civilian workers and artisans were also employed, both for their
artisanal skills and sometimes to meet labor shortages in short-term pro-
jects, such as construction and maintenance.
The workers and artisans were, depending on their backgrounds and
skills, distributed among several factories and workshops within the
complex. These facilities housed a wide range of tasks, from the con-
struction and maintenance of vessels to the production of various
machines, guns, and other materials needed for the ships and the army in
general. At times, each of the factories employed hundreds of workers.
‘‘problems’’ for the state authority. An ideal way to overcome this problem is to locate and focus
on ‘‘ego-documents’’, which this article endeavors to do via analyses of petitions from the
workers. However, it should be noted that although the practice of petitioning had a long
history in the Ottoman Empire and was widely used by ordinary people as a means of voicing
their discontent, the original copies of many petitions were not preserved to evidence the
summaries of them made by officials in their correspondence. Naturally, these summaries
necessarily reflect the concerns and selective perspectives of the officials, and do not allow us to
hear the actual voices of the petitioners. In effect, this has been one of the reasons why studies
about petitions and petitioning have been scarce, despite some recent attempts. See, for example,
E. Gara, C.K. Neumann, and M.E. Kabadayı (eds), Popular Participation and Political Resis-
tance in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi (Istanbul, 2011), especially
the chapters in ‘‘Part 1: Petitioning Practices’’. Although this article presents examples from
original petitions that were discovered in the course of research, a significant portion of the
sources concerning the workers, their discontents, and their actions comes from state corre-
spondence. Therefore, in many cases we shall have to extract the workers’ voices and actions
only through ‘‘seizing the documents by the throat’’, as Deringil put it in a different context. See
S. Deringil, ‘‘The Study of the Armenian Crisis of the Late Ottoman Empire, or, Seizing the
Document by the Throat’’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 27 (2002), pp. 35–59.
7. See A. I˙hsan Gencer, Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti’nin
Kurulus-u (Istanbul, 1985).
398 Akın Sefer
This was especially the case during the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz
(1861–1876), whose pursuit of the ambitious project of creating one
of the world’s largest navies placed the Arsenal at the very center of
this endeavor. In 1871, the ironworks employed 284 workers, the
machine factory 257, and the repair factory 347. Besides factory
workers, there were also sizeable numbers of workers in artisanal
jobs, such as carpenters, masons, tinsmiths, and painters, as well as
lesser-skilled laborers, including porters and construction workers.8
The size of this working community dramatically decreased after the
severe economic depression of the mid-1870s. Nevertheless, civilian
workers remained central to the production process throughout the
following decades.
Although these employees differed widely in terms of their backgrounds,
qualifications and/or technical expertise, they were all categorized under
Figure 1. Workers in the boiler shop in the late nineteenth century. Workers were distributed
throughout various workshops and factories in the Imperial Naval Arsenal.
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Abdul Hamid II Collection,LC-USZ62-
81725. Used with permission.
8. For a list of those facilities with the number of their workers, see S-akir Batmaz,
‘‘II. Abdulhamit Devri Osmanlı Donanması’’ (Ph.D. Erciyes University, 2002), pp. 127–128.
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the term amele (worker) throughout Ottoman government correspondence.
Even foreign ‘‘masters’’ (master craftsmen and tradesmen) who were
brought to the Arsenal for their skills and expertise were denoted by
this term.9 However, this was not always the case in the workers’ self-
perceptions. For example, a petition sent to a newspaper during the
economic crisis in 1873 was signed by the ‘‘poor carpenters and workers
of the Arsenal’’, which suggests that at least some qualified artisans did
not identify themselves as ‘‘workers’’.10 Nevertheless, as this and other
collective actions of the era suggest, this distinction remained semantic,
especially as it did not lead to any disparities that would have otherwise
prevented the workers from acting together against the state for their
collective interest.
Indeed, by the revolution in 1908, the workers had come to identify
themselves as is-c¸i or amele, each of which corresponds to the term
‘‘worker’’, regardless of their backgrounds and artisanal skills. The texts of
the petitions presented by the Arsenal workers in this period do not
differentiate between skilled and unskilled workers. A roster of the
names, places of origin, and jobs of fifty-eight unemployed workers who
signed a petition as ‘‘Arsenal workers’’ lists many skilled and unskilled
workers (for example, carpenters and construction workers) together;
likewise, neither the petitions nor the related correspondence make any
distinction between the workers with artisanal skills. Hence, even this
differentiation within the workers’ self-perceptions appears to have been
discarded within three decades.
Subsuming their differences in pursuit of a common identity was likely
a challenging process, for such divergences were not limited only to the
workers’ skills. Because the Arsenal was a large and heterogeneous
complex rather than a single specific workplace for a particular under-
taking, workers were distributed among different tasks throughout various
workshops and factories. Although recent studies have highlighted
specific industry-related examples where kinship and common homeland
played a central role in workers’ mobilization,11 these factors do not seem
to have exerted a similar influence at the Arsenal, primarily due to the
heterogeneity of the production processes there.12 Although there were
9. Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, [hereafter BOA] Y.PRK.ASK.53/63.
10. Hadika, no.54, 26 Zilkade 1289 (25 January 1873), p. 1.
11. M.E. Kabadayı, ‘‘Working in a Fez Factory in Istanbul in the Late Nineteenth Century:
Division of Labour and Networks of Migration Formed along Ethno-Religious Lines’’,
International Review of Social History, 54 (2009), Supplement 17, pp. 69–90.
12. In a notable instance, a report from 1906 on the leaders of striking workers mentions
their different occupations (i.e. workers from the boiler shop and the power plant as well
as a carpenter), and their different homelands (i.e. Sivas, Ankara, Kemah, and Istanbul);
BOA.Y.MTV 285/57.
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indeed workers who came from the same homelands, the overall work-
force at the Arsenal remained highly heterogeneous in terms of places of
origin. Moreover, the workers did not maintain a union, guild, or any
other such institution which would have facilitated their networking. As
such, the distinctive nature of the production processes posed a serious
obstacle to their collective mobilization, especially after the dissolution of
Parliament in 1878, when government intolerance against any form of
contentious collective actions increased significantly.
Aside from their problems with the state, these workers were also
united by common experiences in their daily lives. The previously noted
petition emphasized that the workers had ‘‘worked loyally’’ for thirty to
forty years as ‘‘Muslims from rural districts’’ to sustain their poor families
still living there.13 Many workers had the chance to work together within
the same complex, if not in the same workshop or factory, for decades,
especially after the failure of the government’s attempts to discharge
civilian workers. Although the workers were from different places, most
were migrant workers from rural districts and had left their families
behind. As with other migrant workers in the capital, the Arsenal workers
probably lived in khans (wayside inns) and in neighborhoods around
the complex.
Unfortunately, specific information about their lives outside the Arsenal
is lacking. It is known, however, from government correspondence which
negatively mentions it, that they met and spent many hours in coffee
houses near the Arsenal. These spaces likely allowed them to discuss the
common problems and anxieties of their daily lives. Such concerns were
hardly limited to problems with their wages. Indeed, being a migrant
worker was itself a source of unease, not least as the Ottoman government
rarely hesitated to ‘‘return’’ workers to their homelands when they became
vocal about their problems. Sometimes the workers’ voices synchronized
into common protest through religious festivals and holy days, when they
expected to be paid (as was traditional) and often needed to spend extra
money for their families and rituals. That the majority of these workers
belonged to a common religion facilitated their use of Islamic festivals and
holy days as an arena for struggle throughout these years.
All of these shared experiences provided a solid basis for their mobi-
lization against a common target, and not only because the Arsenal
remained part of the Naval Administration during this period. Of course,
that the government was also the workers’ employer had much to do with
why their discontent was directed at state authorities; however, this
situation was more complex than it may appear. The Imperial Arsenal, as
a military institution critical to the government, was never allowed to be
13. BOA. BEO. 3380/253454.
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autonomous but instead was always maintained as a specific niche within
the larger schemes of the Ottoman rulers. The government always
adopted a direct, ‘‘hands-on’’ attitude towards the Arsenal and its workers;
such policies ranged from the introduction of universal conscription
and efforts towards industrial modernization to enthusiastic policies for
establishing a powerful navy, the management of financial crises, and
social control of the population.
At the same time, especially in the Hamidian period, the state was
endeavoring to boost its influence and visibility in daily affairs, particularly
through the Sultan’s efforts to increase the ‘‘personal, paternalistic, and
unbureaucratic’’ character of his power.14 By means of welfare policies and
symbolic practices that especially targeted the poor, Sultan Abdulhamid II
expanded his personal power at the expense of the bureaucracy. His policies
and practices also enabled the workers to mobilize collectively against
government bureaucracy, which they held responsible for their suffering.15
In this way, the Sultan’s policies became the precise areas whereby the class
solidarity of Arsenal workers developed and materialized. Before exam-
ining these areas, however, we must first understand the history of the
workers’ acrimonious relations with the government.
THE MILITARIZATION OF THE LABOR FORCE
AND ITS FAILURE
Despite their employment being a significant necessity for the government,
the civilian workers in the Arsenal were a source of various economic
and social problems for the authorities. Being hired from outside the
navy, they were more costly in comparison with the working sailors.16
14. Nadir O¨zbek, ‘‘Imperial Gifts and Sultanic Legitimation during the late Ottoman Empire,
1876–1909’’, in M. Ener, A. Singer, and M. Bonner (eds) Poverty and Charity in the Middle
Eastern Contexts (New York, 2003), pp. 203–220, 206.
15. In effect, this seems to be why, despite celebrating the revolution and the end of ‘‘tyranny’’,
Arsenal workers and the general Ottoman population did not have an explicit goal to overthrow
the Sultan. This detachment of the ruler from the rest of the state bureaucracy can be seen in other
cases as well. For instance, in his study on the Iranian revolution, Asef Bayat shows that the urban
poor engaged in a ‘‘parallel struggle’’ to change their own lives without necessarily aiming at
overthrowing the Shah, who was viewed ‘‘as outside of their day-to-day troubles’’. See Asef
Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran (New York, 1997), p. 39.
16. Occasionally, the government ordered the master artisans who produced rifles in the
provinces (such as Macedonia and Mosul) to be brought to the Arsenal, in order to isolate
them from the local rebels. See BOA.DH.MKT.2467/48, BOA.DH.MKT.2521/102, and
BOA.Y.PRK.BS-K.31/90. A British newspaper reported that skilled workers in the Arsenal were
paid from 2s.–5s. a day (by comparison, British engineers working there were paid 13s. a day);
Pall Mall Gazette, ‘‘The Industrial Classes in Turkey’’, 26 January 1872. In 1906 an Ottoman
official determined that the daily wages paid to civilian and military workers were generally
around 14 kurus- and 3.5 kurus- respectively; BOA.Y.MTV.285/57.
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Moreover, they were more difficult to discipline and had to be kept under
constant surveillance as they were not a part of the hierarchical military
order. The Ottoman authorities commonly referred to them as bas-ıbozuks
(unruly), a term often used to refer to irregulars who worked for the army
(in both combatant and non-combatant roles) but did not belong to the
army hierarchy.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the wake of the conscription system
introduced in the 1840s, one of the government’s initial attempts was to
replace these workers in the Arsenal with cheaper and more disciplined
military labor recruited from throughout the Empire. Indeed, in 1851, the
government decided to recruit non-Muslim soldiers into the Naval Arsenal,
to replace the bas-ıbozuk workers.17 Initially, the non-combatant character of
military service in the Arsenal was thought to be especially attractive to non-
Muslims, who had become disenchanted with the new system of universal
conscription owing to it now including Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
It was also an ideal option for the government, given its lack of enthusiasm
for conscripting non-Muslims into combat forces. Yet in the 1850s the
policy failed in the wake of widespread resistance from non-Muslims against
the new system of conscription.18 As a result, non-Muslims were granted
the right to exemption from military duty via a special tax.19
This failure did not deter the authorities from seeking to militarize the
labor force in the Naval Arsenal. The system of universal conscription
remained to be institutionalized, however, mostly because of opposition
from local populations who resisted the new policy by violent reaction or
simply by evading conscription.20 More important, however, was the
government’s dilemma regarding this militarization. Even when con-
scripts were brought to the Arsenal to join the labor force, they often
turned out to be untrained for their jobs and unskilled. And although they
could be trained in the Arsenal over a period of years, they were supposed
to be released after their terms of duty concluded. This was a highly
obvious source of inefficiency in the operations of the Arsenal’s various
workshops and specific shipbuilding projects. The need for a skilled,
trained, and experienced workforce was most acute after the 1860s, when
Sultan Abdulaziz launched his ambitious campaign to build a large and
powerful naval force for the Ottoman Empire.21 However, this project
17. Ufuk Gu¨lsoy, Osmanlı’nın Gayrimu¨slim Askerleri (Istanbul, 2010), p. 56.
18. Ibid., pp. 56–58.
19. Erik Jan Zu¨rcher, ‘‘The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844–1914’’, International Review
of Social History, 43 (1998), pp. 437–449, 444.
20. For a number of case studies on the instances of resistance against conscription, see Eric Jan
Zu¨rcher (ed.), Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia,
1775–1925 (New York [etc.], 1999).
21. Batmaz, ‘‘II. Abdulhamit Devri Osmanlı Donanması’’, p. 127.
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necessarily depended on skilled master craftsmen and workers hired from
outside the conscription system, who could remain employed in the
Arsenal for as long as the projects continued. During the years following,
the Sultan would eventually come to favor the efficiency of the existing
working process in the Arsenal over the hope of creating a less costly and
more disciplined labor force.
From the mid-century on, the palace’s keen appetite for developing the
navy would be further whetted, especially thanks to British credit, and
enabled by British engineers, master craftsmen, and workers invited to
contribute to this goal. New and expensive machines were bought to the
Arsenal, and several facilities and workshops were built for the con-
struction of powerful ironclad ships for the navy. These developments
required not only larger numbers of workers, but also workers with the
particular skills and abilities to operate the new machines and workshops
and to supervise these projects. By the 1870s, these efforts had yielded a
certain degree of success: the Ottoman navy was now considered to be
‘‘the third in strength in the whole world’’ (after Britain and France).
Figure 2. The torpedo factory in the Arsenal. The Imperial Naval Arsenal became one of the
epicenters of industrial modernization throughout the nineteenth century.
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Abdul Hamid II Collection, LC-USZ62-
81721. Used with permission.
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This achievement was often presented by the British press as a ‘‘British’’
accomplishment in the Ottoman Empire.22 However, the presence of
foreign workers in the Arsenal posed further problems for the Ottoman
authorities. British employees earned more than native workers, and not
paying them regularly risked not only harming relations with the British
government but also tarnishing the prestige of the Ottoman government.
The public, especially in Britain, read news about British workers in
Istanbul whose wages had been in arrears for several months. The erup-
tion of the global financial crisis in the early 1870s rendered it far more
difficult for the Ottoman government to obtain loans from the European
markets, and the British workers soon became an even more pressing
financial burden for the Arsenal.
In 1873, the government began gradually to discharge the British master
craftsmen and artisans by not extending their contracts with the Arsenal.
The authorities were convinced that native workers had now reached the
necessary levels of technical knowledge and skills no longer to need
supervision from the British.23 Of course, British newspapers did not
share the same confidence, and complained about the dismissals.24 As the
number of discharged British workers increased with the worsening
economic crisis in the mid-1870s, a British journalist, ostensibly infuriated
by the Ottoman government’s plan to replace its British employees with
native workers, concluded that the Imperial Arsenal, ‘‘like so many other
unlucky attempts at European civilization under Ottoman rule, must be
pronounced a failure’’.25
The following years witnessed a dramatic decrease in the number of
British workers, yet foreign workers did not disappear entirely from the
Naval Arsenal. Throughout the Hamidian period there remained a need
for the expertise and skills of foreign craftsmen and workers, albeit less so
than previously. However, parallel to the improving diplomatic relations
with Germany (which had occurred at the expense of Britain) during this
era, the profile of the foreign labor force was becoming increasingly
diversified, and now included German workers alongside British ones. In
1896, for example, the number of German workers nearly equaled that of
the British.26 Yet, even with such minimal numbers of foreign workers,
22. The Standard, ‘‘The Turkish Iron-Clad Fleet’’, 2 January 1871, and ‘‘Turkey: The Imperial
Arsenal at Haskeui’’, 11 February 1871; Western Times, ‘‘Turkey in Europe: Sailing of the
Turkish Fleet under an English Admiral’’, 12 July 1876.
23. The Morning Post, ‘‘Turkey’’, 22 November 1873.
24. Ibid.
25. The Star, ‘‘English Colonies on the Bosphorus’’, 26 February 1876.
26. Of 25 foreign workers, 11 were British and 9 were German. See Kaori Komatsu, ‘‘1896’da
Osmanlı Bahriyesi’nde Yabancılar ve Gayri Mu¨slimler’’, Tarih ve Toplum, 139 (1995),
pp. 16–22, 20.
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the problems that hampered payment of wages did not recede. In 1896, a
British newspaper warned British citizens planning to leave for jobs in the
Imperial Arsenal that workers there had not received payment for several
months and were thus facing serious economic difficulties.27 The same
year, nine German workers in the Arsenal collectively resigned because
their wages had been in arrears for months.28
Although in the 1890s occasional voices within the bureaucracy argued
for the reliability of native workers, the Ottoman government did not
completely forgo its reliance on foreign master craftsmen, and still made
occasional attempts to recruit professionals from abroad to supervise new
projects in the Arsenal.29 Localization of the labor force, however, was
not the ultimate goal and solution for the government. The financial crisis
deteriorated severely in the 1870s, leading to the declaration of a mor-
atorium in 1875. This intensified the pressures on the authorities to
institute a far more efficient state of management in the Naval Arsenal, as
well as a better disciplined and more obedient labor force. Yet, civilian
workers demonstrated forcefully that they could not be kept silent in the
face of growing economic hardship. The workers of the Naval Arsenal
were severely impacted by the economic crisis, with their wages falling
into arrears for such long periods that it became a major challenge to cope
with the unfavorable economic conditions.30 Their restlessness was
evinced by a number of massive strikes during this period.31
In January 1873, 500–600 Muslim and non-Muslim workers of the
Arsenal went on strike, having not received their wages in 11 months.32 They
marched together to the Sublime Porte (Baˆb-ı Aˆli), the government complex
that housed the Grand Vizierate and other main government offices, and
27. Aberdeen Journal, ‘‘British Workmen in Turkey: A Warning’’, 8 June 1896.
28. Batmaz, ‘‘II. Abdulhamit Devri Osmanlı Donanması’’, p. 151.
29. Ibid., pp. 152–154.
30. For a contemporary account which describes the misery of Arsenal workers and workers in
general, underlining how ‘‘the anger’’ among the poor was connected to plots against the
government, see Pall Mall Gazette, ‘‘Affairs at Constantinople’’, 15 March 1876. Indeed, two
and a half months later Sultan Abdulaziz was toppled as a result of one such plot.
31. Strikes also occurred in other sectors during this period. For an overview of workers’
collective actions in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century, see Yavuz Selim
Karakıs-la, ‘‘The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial Working Class, 1839–1923’’, in
D. Quataert and E.J. Zu¨rcher (eds), Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and
the Turkish Republic, 1839–1950 (London [etc.], 1995), pp. 19–34, and Cevdet Kırpık,
‘‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde I˙s-c¸iler ve I˙s-c¸i Hareketleri (1876–1914)’’ (Ph.D. Su¨leyman Demirel
University, 2004).
32. It should be noted that this did not always mean that they had worked without pay for
consecutive months during the entire period. Rather, it sometimes included the total number of
unpaid months from the previous year(s) as well. Nevertheless, as details about these unpaid
months were not always clearly expressed, it sometimes led to confusion even among the
bureaucrats, as revealed in their correspondence on the issue.
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presented a petition to the Grand Vizier. A few days later, this time joined
by their mothers and wives, the workers attempted to present a collective
petition during the Friday Prayer Ceremony (Cuma Selamlıg˘ı).33 They
were stopped by the police and, after a violent clash with these forces,
were eventually dispersed. However, this did not discourage the workers,
who also sought to make their voices heard in the press. In one such
petition dispatched to a newspaper, the workers complained about their
desperate conditions and requested that the newspaper publicize their
dire circumstances and organize an aid campaign for them. As if to
demonstrate the workers’ despair, the same days also witnessed riots
by Arsenal workers, who ‘‘plundered’’ the rations of naval officers. The
workers’ anger, it seemed clear, could only be appeased by paying them
their long-overdue wages.34
The disparity between the demands of the Arsenal workers and the
financial restraints of the government led to other strikes and collective
actions. The strikes continued throughout the following years, and
reached their peak in the spring of 1876, when 2,000 workers went on
strike, joined by their wives.35 Although this strike, as with previous ones,
was resolved through financial compensation to the workers, it led the
authorities to opt for immediate militarization of the labor force. Soon,
almost 1,000 workers were dismissed from the Arsenal, with the intention
of replacing them with conscripted sailors from the navy. This measure
was actively applauded by the British press. One correspondent, report-
ing the dismissals, encouraged the Ottoman authorities to extend the scale
of this militarization to encompass all infrastructural projects across the
Empire. This would, according to the correspondent, help to accelerate
and reduce the costs of efforts to modernize the less developed parts of
33. In the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan’s attendance at Friday Prayers was a ceremonial, during
which subjects were given the opportunity to present their petitions to him. About Friday
Prayer ceremonies in this era, see Mehmet I˙ps-irli, ‘‘Osmanlılar’da Cuma Selamlıg˘ı: Halk-
Hu¨ku¨mdar Mu¨nasebetleri Ac¸ısından O¨nemi’’, in Prof. Dr. Bekir Ku¨tu¨kog˘lu’na Armag˘an
(Istanbul, 1991) pp. 459–471.
34. Hadika, no. 54, 26 Zilkade 1289 (25 January 1873), pp. 1–2. See also Oya Sencer, Tu¨rkiye’de
I˙s-c¸i Sınıfı:Dog˘us-u ve Yapısı (Istanbul, 1969), pp. 135–137. The newspaper was banned for
two months after this coverage, on the basis of ‘‘perturbing the minds’’: see Hadika, no. 57,
30 Muharrem 1290 (30 March 1873), p. 1.
35. Sencer, Tu¨rkiye’de I˙s-c¸i Sınıfı, pp. 140–141. The occasional and collective involvement of
women alongside their husbands in labor struggles offers a glimpse into the formation of
workers’ discontent and solidarity, not only on the shopfloor but also in the household. Further
research on the everyday lives of workers and their relations to the larger society will allow us
to ‘‘make women visible to labor history’’, as Balsoy puts it, through examining their roles not
only in the production process, but also in the everyday lives of male workers. For a recent
study on women factory workers in Ottoman Istanbul, see G. Balsoy, ‘‘Gendering Ottoman
Labor History: The Cibali Re´gie Factory in the Early Twentieth Century’’, International
Review of Social History, 54 (2009), Supplement 17, pp. 45–68.
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the Empire, such as the Armenian regions in the eastern provinces.36 Even
after the massive dismissals, a civilian workforce still remained in the
Arsenal. This was largely due to a crucial dilemma that the Ottoman
authorities had contended with since the mid-century: even as they
were seeking ways to establish a cheap yet disciplined labor force, they
also desperately needed workers with the necessary technical skills and
experience and who could be employed without time restrictions. Hence,
the same tumultuous period which witnessed large-scale dismissals as well
as persistent collective actions by the workers also saw many of the
remaining workers assigned to permanent status. In February 1876, in
response to petitions from the Arsenal workers, these more experienced
workers were granted permanent status and were registered into
insurance funds.37
Figure 3. The Boys’ Battalions were introduced to overcome the problems associated with the
militarization of labor in the Naval Arsenal.
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Abdul Hamid II Collection, LC-USZ62-
81707. Used with permission.
36. The correspondent also mentions that ‘‘the same parsimonious plan has already been tried’’
at the Imperial Armory (Tophaˆne-i Aˆmire) in Istanbul, and ‘‘will probably be also continued
there’’; Western Times, ‘‘Turkey in Europe’’, 12 July 1876.
37. BOA, I˙.DH.717/50103.
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This dilemma was the subject of a series of special reports and corre-
spondences submitted to the palace in 1882. The reports of the Naval
Council (S- uˆraˆ-i Bahriye), after detailing the problem, proposed as
a solution the introduction of Boys’ Battalions (Sıbyan Taburları) to
gradually replace Industrial Regiments (Sanayi Alayları) of conscripted
soldiers. These battalions, according to the reports, would be attended by
children between the ages of thirteen and nineteen, and offered an ideal
solution. As the new organization would be a military school, there
would be no problems with regard either to the cost of the young workers
or to their obedience and discipline. Moreover, they would be employed
for a fairly long time as compared to regular conscripts, particularly
because, upon finishing school at age nineteen, they would be immedi-
ately conscripted into military service, thereby allowing them to be
employed for another four years in the Arsenal.38 Being a cheap, dis-
ciplined and available labor force, Boys’ Battalions offered the best
solution to a crucial problem facing the authorities.
Indeed, following the reports prepared for the palace, the Boys’
Battalions began to recruit youngsters in 1889. The number of recruits
gradually decreased, however, and the endeavor soon failed. Indeed,
during the 1897 war against Greece, all of the recruits from the Boys’
Battalions were transferred to combat forces.39 Exacerbating the problem
was a persistent lack of personnel even in the Industrial Regiments, from
which many soldiers were either transferred to combat forces during
the same war or deployed to suppress internal rebellions.40 Once again,
the government’s ambitions to militarize the entire labor force were
supplanted by the reality of civilian workers.
The authorities’ inability and failure to militarize the Arsenal’s
labor force became an even more pressing issue during and after the
Ottoman–Russian War of 1877–1878. The war worsened the already
devastated Ottoman economy, and severely impacted the daily lives of the
Ottoman working classes. Sky-rocketing inflation forced the prospect of
starvation on to the workers, whose challenging conditions already
included difficulties in obtaining their wages. Although the Imperial
Naval Arsenal had managed to decrease the number of civilian workers to
around 800, it still faced serious troubles, especially given its need to
increase workers’ wages and its inability to fund the additional costs
such action would create for the Treasury. In trying to address these
challenging conditions, the authorities once again sought ways to reduce
maximally the number of workers in the Arsenal. In 1878, upon a request
38. BOA.Y.A.RES.15/34.
39. Batmaz, ‘‘II. Abdulhamit Devri Osmanlı Donanması’’, pp. 83–85.
40. Ibid., pp. 80–81.
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from the Naval Ministry, the palace issued a decree ensuring that wages
would keep pace with inflation. This act would cost the Treasury an
additional 150,000 kurus-, to be funded by worker lay-offs. Accordingly,
older workers and those with certain disabilities were to be immediately
retired with compensation, along with any workers who were ‘‘unnecessary
and lazy in their service’’. This measure would allow for much of the
additional new costs to be offset by the money saved from no longer
paying these workers’ wages.41 However, this proved to be yet another
problem. Retirement funds were based almost entirely on cash deducted
as a certain percentage from workers’ wages. The workforce reductions
instituted in recent years had already negatively impacted the balances of
the retirement funds, due to the increasing gap between the number of
retirees and the current number of workers. In short, to increase further
the ranks of retirees while also reducing the number of active workers
would be disastrous for retirement funds. Therefore, through the second
half of 1879, the government decided that, in addition to decreasing the
number of workers (from 800 to 300), the rate of deductions from wages
would be increased from 2 to 5 per cent.42
Although this was considered a temporary solution for the maintenance
of retirement funds, the measures were not good news for the workers. It
was not unusual for them to find their wages in arrears, but they were at
least working in the Imperial Arsenal, where, even in the early 1870s,
workers could confidently ‘‘rely on continuous employment’’.43 Yet, by
the second half of the decade, even this proved to be no longer the case.
The workers’ anxieties about losing their jobs, coupled with their hitherto
existing problems in obtaining their wages – all of which intensified with
the onset of the crises – go far in explaining why the workers emerged as
one of the most active and radical groups of the decade. It was hardly a
coincidence that while the government’s bureaucrats were negotiating
amongst themselves about how to deal with the workers and their wages,
the Arsenal workers were seeking to join this negotiation process by their
own demonstrations and strikes. By the end of the 1870s, workers in the
Imperial Arsenal had succeeded in giving the impression that they had
achieved certain collective repertoires, which they frequently employed
against the authorities during these years.
Government correspondence about a collective strike in May 1880
suggests how the workers of the Arsenal were conscious of the collective
power evidenced in these established repertoires, and how this solidarity
was perceived by the authorities as a serious threat. By the spring of 1880,
41. BOA.I˙.S-D.39/2041.
42. BOA.I˙.S-D.48/2649.
43. Pall Mall Gazette, ‘‘The Industrial Classes in Turkey’’.
410 Akın Sefer
the authorities had implemented several measures in recent months
that had proved to be less effective than had been desired. Having not
been paid for almost fifteen months, Arsenal workers went on strike,
‘‘resolutely declaring’’ that they would not return to work until they were
paid at least two months’ wages. As they marched to several govern-
ment offices, including that of the Grand Vizier, to voice their demands,
they drew the attention of the palace, which asked the Naval Ministry
to provide information about the reasons for the workers’ actions. In
response, Rasim Pasha, the Minister, reported that although the
authorities had tried to appease the workers by promising to provide
them with daily bread, the workers remained unconvinced and persisted
in their demands. However, according to the Minister, the manner in
which they were voicing their demands had become a more serious
concern, and this latest incident was fairly consistent with previous
such actions:
The workers, when they would like to go to the sublime offices to voice their
conditions, need to do so by preparing a petition, which should be presented by
a few leading members among them. Nonetheless, [the workers] have hitherto
made it their custom to dare to go collectively and to create annoyance, and
their current actions as well are rooted in their old customs [y].44
No matter how ‘‘old’’ Pasha may have thought these ‘‘customs’’, his
words suggest that the Arsenal workers maintained a long-established
commitment to a repertoire of struggle. This traditional way of struggle
supposedly pointed to a different rationality among the workers, one that
was outside the imposed procedures for voicing discontent via petition.
The Minister’s words show that the workers were quite successful in
establishing an alternative channel in a collective and continuous way. In
order to understand how they were able to forge a collective solidarity
powerful enough to survive the crises of the 1870s, and to recognize the
ability that enabled them to form this solidarity along class lines without
relying on any formal institutions, we need to trace the experiences of
workers and their relations with the state in a historical process. This will
allow us to see how this process reveals certain patterns through which
the workers were able to maintain and consolidate this solidarity on the
basis of class struggle.
SPECTACLES OF CLASS SOLIDARITY
Although the Ottoman economy managed to extricate itself from the
deep depression of the 1870s, the regular payment of wages remained a
problem and appears to have been the most important catalyst underlying
44. BOA. Y.PRK.ASK.4/11.
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the struggles in this period. However, this observation is based on the
available historical documents at our disposal, and it is likely that further
research will reveal other, non-economic dimensions of these struggles.
The economic problem was undeniably a major source of the workers’
discontent with the government, yet there were other sources of strife as
well, including ethno-religious conflicts in the 1890s. For instance, after
Armenian rebellions in Anatolia and Istanbul were suppressed in the first
half of the 1890s, often by violent measures that included massacres, many
Armenian workers were dismissed from their jobs in the capital. After
1895, many Armenian workers were gradually discharged from the
Arsenal and from government jobs elsewhere in the city.45
Interestingly, these dismissals were immediately exploited by the
government (which replaced the Armenians with Muslims, who were
purportedly more loyal) and by other communities, who sought to take
advantage of these events for their own benefit. For instance, the patriarch
of the Assyrian community in Istanbul wrote a petition asking the
government to replace the Armenian workers, ‘‘who were discharged
due to their treachery and sedition’’, with members of the Assyrian
community.46 Thus, even the relations between the Armenian workers
and workers from other communities in the 1890s indicate that concerns
about wages and general economic problems were not the only factor
shaping the workers’ relations with each other, with the larger society, and
with the Ottoman state.47
How the workers’ class solidarity was consolidated and reproduced
through their struggle against the government’s failure to pay their wages
can be further understood by focusing on the workers’ relations with the
government. Throughout this period, the Hamidian government was
effectively Janus-faced towards the working classes. On the one hand,
Sultan Abdulhamid II implemented certain practices intended to reinvi-
gorate and reconsolidate his legitimacy, which had been undermined by
the crises of the 1870s. To this end, he engaged in many philanthropic
45. The Standard, ‘‘The Armenian Question – The Powers and Turkey’’, 8 July 1895.
According to Komatsu, 22 Armenians worked in the Arsenal in 1896; Komatsu, ‘‘1896’da
Osmanlı Bahriyesi’nde Yabancılar ve Gayri Mu¨slimler’’, p. 20. Considering the dismissals, this
number must have been higher prior to 1895. Some Armenian workers had to escape abroad
during these incidents. These included a retired Arsenal worker who went to Bulgaria but asked
the government to continue his retirement wage. It was decided that he could receive the wages
only if it was clear that he was not among ‘‘the corrupted’’; BOA.A.MKT.MHM.633/21.
46. BOA. DH.TMI˙K.M.14/39
47. This is also the case with regard to different dimensions of solidarity among the
Ottoman workers. See for instance, M. Erdem Kabadayı, ‘‘Working for the State in a Factory in
Istanbul: The Role of Factory Workers’ Ethno-Religious and Gender Characteristics in
State–Subject Interaction in the Late Ottoman Empire’’ (Ph.D. Ludwig Maximilian University,
2008).
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activities and other such actions targeting the welfare of the lower classes.
These efforts were further maintained by increasing the use and visibility
of symbolic ceremonies so as to corroborate the paternal image of the
Sultan.48 However, these practices were accompanied by a series of
repressive policies meant to prevent formation of any collective move-
ments, organizations, or actions against the state. In focusing on how these
policies functioned through the material relations between government and
workers, it is possible to acknowledge that these policies in fact evolved
into arenas where workers could adapt their collective discontent into
demonstrations of class solidarity.
The most obvious way to impede workers from becoming involved in
any open, collective discontent was to require and encourage them to
convey their dissatisfaction and demands through ‘‘proper’’ channels.
In fact, this was a necessary outcome of the period’s continuing crisis
concerning payment of wages. With the government unable to solve this
problem completely, it was impossible to prevent the release of anger and
frustration on the part of workers. So in order to keep the workers’
unavoidable restlessness under control, the state authorities tried urging
workers to convey their complaints through the proper submission of
petitions – that is, having representatives present the petition, rather than
doing so collectively. The petition process was not specific to either the
Hamidian period or to the Ottoman Empire in general. Throughout
Ottoman history, as well as the history of other societies, the practice of
petitioning had been used by authorities for this same purpose, and had
been likewise manipulated by lower classes.49 Ottoman authorities who
wrote about the workers’ collective actions often underscored the idea
that, although workers had the right to appeal to government offices with
their complaints and demands, they must always do so individually and
by petition. Any gathering, regardless of size, for such purposes was
unacceptable to the authorities.
A particularly notable example of this mentality on the part of the
authorities, and the workers’ resistance to it, is discussed in correspon-
dence about a gathering of ‘‘a few hundred workers’’ from the Arsenal
that took place in front of the Sublime Porte. The workers were pro-
testing the decision to give them bonds in return for wages that had been
48. See Selim Deringil, The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the
Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London [etc.], 1999), and Nadir O¨zbek, Osmanlı I˙mpar-
atorlug˘u’nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, I˙ktidar, Mes-ruiyet, 1876–1914 (Istanbul, 2002).
49. See Lex Heerma van Voss, ‘‘Introduction’’, International Review of Social History,
46 (2001), Supplement 9, pp. 1–10. For an analysis focusing on the practice of petitioning by the
Ottoman lower classes, see John Chalcraft, ‘‘Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt
on the Eve of Colonial Rule’’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37 (2005),
pp. 303–325.
Radicalization of Arsenal Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire 413
owed since the previous year. They were also complaining about not
having been paid for almost six months in the current year. In his report
on the event, the mayor (S- ehremini) emphasized that he had strongly
cautioned them against leaving their jobs, for ‘‘it would not be proper for
them to attempt to make their requests by such an organized collectivity’’.
According to the mayor, if the workers would submit their request to the
Sultan by sending representatives to present it to him, it was quite obvious
that their demands would be accepted.50 This reasoning did not convince
the workers. A few days later, when they were offered small payments
instead of full wages, they again left work, stating that they would not
return until they had been sufficiently paid. This demand was not modified
until the government promised to pay a month’s wages.51
The policy’s ineffectiveness in subsequent years led the government to
take increasingly more repressive measures against workers. One favored
method of blocking strikes was to arrest the presumed ‘‘leaders’’, ‘‘agitators’’,
or ‘‘provocateurs’’ among the workers. This policy operated on the
assumption that the workers would be appeased when isolated from the
(supposed) leading members. However, such attempts by the government
sometimes inadvertently revealed the degree of solidarity amongst the
members of the working-class community in the Arsenal. In April and May
of 1888, Arsenal workers launched a series of strikes and demonstrations
in response to the latest non-payment of their wages. The authorities,
having failed to solve the financial problem or to stop the increasing
number of collective actions, arrested ‘‘the first among the agitators’’,
one Mehmed from Eyub. Upon news of his arrest, the workers, now led
by a certain Arif and a Mehmed Ali from Trabzon, ‘‘came to the police
station and attempted to take Mehmed’’. As the correspondence notes,
the police ‘‘defended’’ the station, and arrested Arif and Mehmed Ali.
The police, although they managed to disperse the group, subsequently
warned others in the government that such demonstrations, if tolerated,
would not only become unmanageable but would spread to other
workers.52
With other demonstrations similarly revealing such measures to be
ineffective, the Ministry, having failed to raise the necessary finance for
the promised wages, now attempted to reduce the size of the workforce
by discharging workers. Yet these actions prompted further resistance. In
September 1893, the Ministry decided to discharge 300 workers from the
Arsenal, claiming that it was unable to pay their wages. It determined to
implement this decision gradually by discharging 20 workers every week
50. BOA.Y.PRK.S-H.2/47.
51. BOA. Y.PRK.ASK.34/44.
52. BOA.I˙.DH./1078–84852, and BOA.Y.PRK.ASK./46–54.
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and encountered resistance not only from the workers, but also from
senior officials who felt threatened by the proposed action. The palace
learned that the workers were resolved to present a petition collectively to
the Sultan on a Friday, which would mean a demonstration during the
Friday Prayer Ceremony.53 Upon receiving this news, Grand Vizier
Cevat Pasha dispatched a message to the palace, criticizing the Minister
for resorting frequently to this sort of measure (such as discharging
workers in order to stabilize the Ministry’s funds), despite the fact that
‘‘[the Ministry] was allotted the largest amount of budget compared to
other military offices’’. As the Ministry had again adopted this measure
without informing the Grand Vizierate, ‘‘it [was] necessary that this
action be prevented’’.54 Indeed, the Grand Vizier’s report demonstrated
that a significant degree of anxiety had been triggered by the workers’
ability, through persistent collective struggles, to pose a formidable threat
in response to policies detrimental to their interests.
This development compelled the authorities to consider alternative
policies to ensure the workers’ loyalty without antagonizing them.
Concerning the material lives of the workers, the most relevant of these
policies was likely the initiation of a paternalistic welfare system targeting
the poor.55 The Hamidian government launched a series of institutions
and practices intended not only to ameliorate the material conditions of
its subjects, but also to increase their loyalty to the state. Religious days
and festivals afforded ample opportunities for the state to bolster and
increase its legitimacy, especially in respect of workers facing severe
economic difficulties. Thus, even during the longer periods when workers’
wages fell into arrears, the Sultan and the Sublime Porte made concerted
efforts to make at least partial payments, which were presented as paternal
gifts from the Sultan.
This policy was, in fact, partially a response to workers’ increasing
expectations that they would see their and their families’ lives relieved
of long-standing economic problems. That certain days functioned as
catalysts to increase workers’ expectations of the government was also a
significant phenomenon in the formation of class solidarity. These reli-
gious days, festivals, and ceremonies functioned as temporal and spatial
hubs wherein discontent among the workers could be mobilized against
the rulers. This was especially crucial, given that political conditions did
not allow for the formation of institutionalized structures by which the
workers could organize. In other words, during these particular days and
ceremonies, workers’ anger and dissatisfaction could be channeled, via
53. BOA. I˙.HUS.16/1311.Ra./53.
54. BOA.Y.A.HUS.280/67.
55. See O¨zbek, Osmanlı’da Sosyal Devlet for an analysis of these policies.
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shared moments and social spaces, against a common target. Thus, during
this era communal cultural practices came to function as a critical com-
ponent in class formation.
In fact, despite the government frequently failing to meet these
expectations, the authorities remained quite conscious of how workers
would react under such circumstances. The possibility that workers’
solidarity would be immediately called upon against the government was
a major source of anxiety and disagreement within the bureaucracy,
especially on the eve of religious days and festivals. An example of such
anxiety is evident in correspondence between the Grand Vizierate, the
Naval Ministry, and the Finance Ministry at the end of April 1889, a few
days before Ramadan. The Naval Ministry complained that the money
deposited by the Treasury for the payment of workers’ wages was
insufficient, emphasizing that any inability to pay the wages would lead to
unease among the workers, especially at the beginning of Ramadan. The
Finance Ministry responded defensively, arguing that other ‘‘urgent
expenses’’ (concerning the military) had left the Treasury with insufficient
funds and that the Naval Ministry should ‘‘handle’’ the situation using
existing finance. However, the Naval Ministry responded forcefully on
the same day, warning that ‘‘if the wages are not paid today, we will not be
able to keep the workers under control’’. Upon this, and under pressure
from the Grand Vizierate, the Finance Minister reluctantly agreed to
pay the necessary amounts, even as he denounced the ‘‘threats and the
vehement language’’ used by his fellow minister.56
Although the Naval Ministry’s warnings had been interpreted as a
‘‘threat’’, they were hardly unjustified, as revealed by an incident two
years later. Arsenal workers had again learned that their full wages would
go unpaid during Ramadan, and were presented with an offer that would
reduce their payments by 30 per cent. The palace was informed that
Arsenal workers were ‘‘convening in groups throughout various places in
order to decide upon the presentation of a petition’’ during the visit of
Hırka-i Saadet. This ceremony, the traditional visit of the Sultan every
mid-Ramadan to the Holy Mantle of the Prophet, was held as a parade to
the mosque where the Mantle was preserved.57 Considered alongside the
workers’ repeated choice of using Friday Prayer Ceremonies for collec-
tive petitioning, this case further highlights how workers were able to
utilize symbolic places and ceremonies for their own purposes. These
ceremonies were originally intended to be spectacles of the Sultan’s per-
sonal power, and were organized as such, but now they were sometimes
subverted by the workers into spectacles of class solidarity and power.
56. BOA.Y.MTV.38/102.
57. BOA.Y.PRK.ML.12/28.
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Therefore, it is unsurprising that religious days, festivals, and ceremonies
often posed a source of uneasiness for government officials.58
The Festival of Sacrifice, another major event for Muslims, led to
similar situations, evoking anxiety among officials and collective dis-
content among workers. In late June 1892, almost two weeks before the
Festival commenced, the Naval Ministry once again requested that the
palace urge the Finance Ministry to transfer the necessary sums of money
to the Navy, so that workers in the Imperial Arsenal could be paid their
wages before the holiday began. The correspondence emphasized the
possibility that the arrival of the Festival might incite disquiet among
the workers.59 Nonetheless, it appears that the government authorities
were unable to solve the problem before the Festival, and, as had been
expected, a strike was declared.60 The disagreement between the two
ministries over how to meet the costs of the workers’ wages remained
unresolved throughout the following month, and thereby contributed to
the continuation of the strikes.61 On the final day of July 1892, the Grand
Vizier adopted a threatening tone towards the Finance Ministry, a tone
that had proved effective in previous disagreements about how to pay
the workers’ wages. He warned the Finance Minister that the current
strikes ‘‘are understood to [have] spread to the boiler shop workers, who
would join the actions’’, and even to soldiers who had not received their
pay.62 This unambiguous threat again proved influential on the Finance
Ministry, which shortly thereafter transferred funds to the Navy for
payment of the wages.63
That discontent in the Arsenal could rapidly spread from one group of
workers to their fellows in other workshops, and thereby eventually lead
to ‘‘unanimous’’ (bi’l ittifak) strikes, was not unusual, as evidenced by the
many strikes and demonstrations during the period. However, the pos-
sibility that such dissent and anger might be transmitted to workers under
military oversight was evidently a dire concern for officials. The scenario
was particularly daunting, as it would entail a mutiny in a capital already
troubled by the specters of the Janissaries (the traditional guards who had
toppled many sultans, but who were violently abolished in 1826). In fact,
as the payment crisis dragged on and the workers persisted in their
struggle to counter it, such fears proved to be grounded. In the 1890s it
58. This was not unique to Muslim workers. For instance, in 1906 workers in the Cibali
tobacco factory in Istanbul went on strike after not receiving their customary payments for
Easter; Nacar, ‘‘Tobacco Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire’’, p. 128.
59. BOA.Y.MTV.63/151.
60. BOA.BEO.35/2557; BEO.35/2563; and BEO.36/2660.
61. BOA.BEO.40/2936.
62. BOA.BEO.41/3074.
63. BOA.BEO.51/3751.
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was not just impoverished workers but also soldiers, especially those
serving outside the palace, who were reported to be ‘‘reduced to such
want as to beg alms from foreigners’’.64 Although the military forces were
under strict discipline and surveillance, the ruling officials could not
afford to assume that these severe problems would not lead to a mutiny in
the heart of the capital.
The fear became a reality in mid-1901, with Reuters reporting to the
British newspapers that 100 ‘‘sailor workmen’’ in the Naval Arsenal had
attempted to demonstrate in front of the palace in Istanbul. Prior to the
demonstration, they had been detained for almost a year upon conclusion
of their service and their wages had long been in arrears. They came
together in front of one of the gates of Arsenal and attempted to push
through the doors:
The stout wooden doors resisted their efforts, and they therefore attacked the
masonry, to loosen the hinges. The officer in charge of the Arsenal, finding they
refused to obey his order to desist from their efforts, and fearful of the con-
sequences if they were to get outside, turned out the guard, who were ordered
to drive the mutinous workmen from the gates. A few bayonet thrusts soon
quelled the disturbance, nine mutineers being more or less severely wounded.
A number of arrests were subsequently effected.65
The report went on to underline the ‘‘starving’’ conditions of the
Arsenal workers (a result of their wages being in arrears for so long), and,
based on the frustrating conditions at the Treasury, to anticipate that these
sorts of events would spread to other ‘‘government departments’’.
According to the correspondent, this latest action by Arsenal workers
proved effective, as the Sultan now promised ‘‘to give satisfaction to the
demands of the demonstrators’’.66 British newspapers reported this news
on 3 June, prompting the Sultan to decree that no British newspapers be
allowed to enter the Empire; he also ordered that an immediate disclaimer
about the event be sent to the British press.67 As such developments
indicate, by the first years of the new century the crisis was understood
to be chronic in nature. New measures attempted by the government
towards ending the wage problem would, through the middle of the
decade, continue to face seemingly unyielding resistance and would
prompt yet another wave of struggles between the workers and the state.
64. Western Gazette, ‘‘Soldiers Begging Alms’’, 23 October 1896. Meanwhile, 100 workers in
the Arsenal went on strike, ‘‘threatening to go to’’ the palace, and could only be appeased by
payment of a small amount of the wages in arrears; Northern Echo, ‘‘Workmen Clamour for
Wages’’, 14 October 1895, and The Star, ‘‘Situation in Turkey’’, 15 October 1896.
65. Sheffield Daily Telegraph, ‘‘The Porte and Unpaid Workmen’’, 3 June 1901.
66. Ibid.
67. BOA.Y.A.HUS.416/59.
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RADICALIZATION AND REVOLUTION
By the turn of the century, it had become commonplace for workers to
leave their jobs temporarily whenever they did not receive proper pay.
Such actions did not necessarily involve collective demonstrations in front
of a government building. In April 1904, for example, groups of Arsenal
workers gathered in coffee houses around Kasımpas-a (the district in the
vicinity of the Arsenal) instead of going to work, in reaction to their
wages not being fully paid. Upon learning of these developments, the
Sultan ordered the Naval Ministry to pay the workers their wages
but to ‘‘kindly warn’’ them against engaging in further such activities.68
However, these sorts of actions had grown even more intolerable for
the government, especially after 1905 with the emergence of a new social
and economic crisis. The growing depression created by the economic
crisis, and the additional taxes now being levied, spurred many anti-
government rebellions amongst local populations throughout Anatolia.
Adding to the intensity of these rebellions was the increasing power and
mobility of political opposition groups throughout both the Balkans and
Anatolia, the most active of whom were the Young Turks and Armenian
Dashnaks.69
Within this context, the tendency of workers to engage in collective
actions against the government seemed to constitute a more serious
potential threat in the capital, as such actions could easily be mobilized in
favor of opposition groups and thereby eventually lead to the palace
facing a mortal crisis. Thus, by the start of 1905, it had become clear to the
government that new steps had to be taken to render this potential threat
as ineffective as possible. For the officials, the most obvious such measure
was to eliminate the extra labor force, which the government regarded as
‘‘unnecessary’’ for the Arsenal. The previous attempts to discharge
workers had failed in the face of the workers’ resistance, and subsequently
temporary workers were, in due course, granted permanent worker status,
even in the absence of immediate jobs in the Arsenal. By 1905, however,
dismissing unnecessary workers from the Arsenal presented an urgent
solution to the economic and social problems created by these surplus
workers. Besides being an additional financial burden on an already
drained Treasury, these workers were prone to appealing for collective
actions to be used to convey their discontent. In this way, such workers
became an increasingly valuable bedrock of support for the opposition.
However, resorting to large-scale layoffs was a double-edged sword for
the government. Although the Ottoman rulers urgently wished to dismiss
workers, they also feared the negative repercussions the policy posed for
68. BOA.Y.MTV.259/57.
69. Haniog˘lu, ‘‘Preparation for a Revolution’’, p. 93.
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the state, especially for the palace. In the summer of 1905, upon the Naval
Ministry’s request to discharge 200 workers from the Arsenal, the palace
ordered that necessary financial arrangements (concerning the workers’
compensation) be made by the Grand Vizierate. However, the corre-
spondence highlighted that these workers were in fact being discharged
‘‘by their own desire’’. This and other similar phrases, such as ‘‘by their
own will’’, were quickly adopted into the language of the dismissals, to
reassure the palace that the workers would not create problems after their
contracts were ended. In August 1905, the Grand Vizierate decided that
the 200 workers, even though they were to be discharged ‘‘by their own
desire’’, should be dismissed gradually rather than en masse, so as to
prevent any occurrences of ‘‘voices and complaints’’.70
The palace’s anxiety about the frequent strikes escalated throughout the
following months, especially with the increasing amount of news about
tax rebellions in Anatolia. This spurred renewed attempts within the
bureaucracy to solve the chronic problem. In March 1906, as workers
undertook a strike just a month after having been paid during the Festival
of Sacrifice, the Sultan ordered the Naval Ministry to form a commission
to discuss the measures necessary to halt the strikes, underscoring
that ‘‘that these [workers] have adopted such unruly actions should be
regarded as being a consequence of provocations by a few among them’’.
Unsurprisingly, the commission, led by the Minister, determined that
these latest actions had initially been instigated by nine workers. The
commission expelled them, as well as twenty-three other workers identified
in the reports and journals. Besides ensuring that these ‘‘provocateurs’’ were
dismissed, the commission urged, in a report, that all remaining workers
should be ‘‘kept under constant surveillance by the officials and soldiers in
the workshops’’. The latter were to report immediately any provocateur
among the workers and were to be held responsible if such disturbances
reoccurred.71
The report also argued that, under normal circumstances, the number of
workers should be doubled. The main problem preventing this was lack
of ‘‘coal and other sorts of materials’’ necessary for operation of the
workshops.72 As these sorts of shortages could not be resolved, the report
urged that temporary workers not be allowed to stay permanently. More
importantly, it also proposed a familiar solution: that all civilian workers
be replaced by soldiers from the Industrial Regiments, who were far less
70. BOA.Y.A.HUS.491/27, and MV.111/77.
71. BOA.Y.MTV.285/57
72. According to Quataert, the failure of the Ottoman government efficiently to extract the
coal in the coalfields in Zonguldak had much to do with relations between the miners and the
state; see D. Quataert, Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: The Zonguldak Coalfield
1822–1920 (New York [etc.], 2006).
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expensive to employ. However, as the Industrial Regiments did not offer
the necessary number of workers, the report demanded that the regiments
employ 450 soldiers from the army, as a temporary solution. In this way,
the rest of the workers in the Arsenal, having been purged of the pro-
vocateurs amongst them, would be reduced numerically and kept under
constant supervision.73
By 1907, however, the state’s chronic problems in financing workers’
wages, as well as the smoldering threat posed by unpaid workers, still
persisted. In fact, this year saw the government’s financial problems
intensify severely, thanks to eruption of a new global financial crisis. The
palace, however, still fearful of triggering collective disobedience, did not
wish to antagonize workers by such dismissals. Indeed, besides not dis-
missing the workers, the palace was also pressing the ministries to make
the workers’ payments as regularly as possible. Throughout the corre-
spondence regarding these payments, an underlining concern was ‘‘the
tendency of workers to begin complaining as the payment day draws
closer’’, especially when payment was delayed.74 Thus, despite the
negotiations within the bureaucracy towards solving this problem at the
workers’ expense, the palace appears to have yielded to the workers’
demands and accepted their irreplaceability. The Sultan, mindful of how
powerful and effective the workers’ solidarity could be in creating further
problems in the capital, opted not to take any measures at their expense.
Eventually, however, this generally passive stance towards the workers
drew reactions from the Sublime Porte, who had to act under constant
pressure from the palace not only to ensure that workers did not pose
security problems, but also to fund their wages during the current poor
economic conditions. In May 1907, after the Arsenal workers again went
on strike, and subsequently received a set amount of money thanks to
pressure from the palace, the Grand Vizier opted to convey to the palace
the impatience of the bureaucracy. He prepared a report complaining
about the palace’s passive attitude towards the workers:
There are no naval constructions in the Arsenal whatsoever, and so it is not
fathomable why so many workers remain employed there and are paid con-
tinuously. Against the urgent recommendations that they should be released, and
preferably expelled and returned to their homelands, various objections have been
put forth that are impossible to be acknowledged by their humble servants. Yet
the problems emanate from the fact that the treasury is continuously hindered in
providing for their financial sustenance and that the workers frequently stand up
to make such demands by coming together collectively. And these problems have
significance beyond any consideration [y].75
73. Ibid.
74. BOA.Y.MTV.295/42. See also Y.A.RES.144/15 and I˙.HUS.151/1325 M–49.
75. BOA.Y.A.HUS.511/80.
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A few days after receiving the Grand Vizier’s report, which warned the
palace to take ‘‘urgent’’ measures to solve the problem in question, the
Sultan questioned the Naval Minister about his views on the subject.
The Minister bemoaned the Grand Vizier’s indifference towards solving
the problems of his ministry, but also confirmed the damages that
unnecessary workers created for the Treasury.76
Following this correspondence, the Sultan was finally convinced of the
need for dismissals; thirty-five workers were discharged ‘‘by their own
will’’ from the Arsenal the same week. However, the Minister was acutely
aware that formulations like ‘‘their own will’’ were mere rhetoric, and he
urged the Ministry of the Police to ensure that the discharged workers
‘‘would not raise subsequent complaints or apply to rejoin the workers of
the Imperial Arsenal’’.77 This anxiety about the workers’ possible reac-
tions proved correct just days later. The workers who had departed the
Arsenal ‘‘by their own desire’’ now assembled and attempted to enter the
Arsenal, with the intention of working on the maintenance of a recently
arrived Russian ship. This action posed such a serious threat to future
plans to discharge additional workers that the Naval Minister urged the
palace to warn the Ministry of the Police immediately to halt these
attempts. Otherwise, warned the Minister, ‘‘[workers’] current actions
would cripple the attempt’’ to balance the budget necessary for regular
payment of wages in the Arsenal.78
However, the remaining workers continued their protests throughout
the payment period;79 the government then adopted more repressive
measures, which further antagonized the workers. A month later, the
government arrested nine workers accused of striking and inciting
others to do likewise. Following these arrests, the rest of the workers
joined together and ‘‘declared that they would not go to work unless the
mentioned workers be released’’.80 Two days later ‘‘more than a thousand
Arsenal workers’’ marched to Bes-iktas-, site of the palace.81 This appears
to have been one of the largest protests the capital had seen in recent
years, and it demonstrated the acute and widespread resentment that
had arisen over the dismissals and the payment crises. Nevertheless, the
palace was resolved not only to expel the arrested workers, but also to
keep them under constant surveillance in whatever cities they were to be
expelled to. On 24 June, a message was sent to five provinces, warning the
governors that these workers had been expelled for industrial agitation
76. BOA.Y.MTV.298/9.
77. BOA.ZB.16/11.
78. BOA.Y.MTV.298/47.
79. See BOA.I˙.HUS.155/1325Ca4.
80. BOA.ZB.16/15.
81. BOA.Y.PRK.ASK.248/46.
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and thus ‘‘must not be allowed to move outside the provinces, or back to’’
the capital.82
The subsequent course of relations between the palace and the
Arsenal workers makes clear that the palace was growing increasingly less
tolerant of the workers and was now ardently resolved to clear the
workers of ‘‘agitators’’ after each strike.83 However, these measures
proved ineffective in stopping the workers. On 8 March 1908, the Arsenal
workers convened ‘‘again’’ in an attempt to march to the palace.84 Four
days later, the Sultan ordered that the agitators and provocateurs amongst
them be banished from the capital. He also cautioned against any further
disorder from other workers while their friends were being expelled.85
The government continued to discharge workers, and there were no
optimistic signs of any permanent solution or easing of tensions in the
Arsenal. In mid-June 1908, the authorities were even ‘‘trying to reassure
the soldiers’’ in the Arsenal, who had expressed discontent upon not being
paid their full wages.86
The Declaration of Liberty in 1908 following the Young Turks’
rebellion in the Balkans thus found an already antagonized and radica-
lized community of workers in the Imperial Naval Arsenal in Istanbul.
Immediately after the Declaration, the working classes of the Ottoman
Empire sought to put their own mark on the revolution by launching a
spontaneous wave of strikes. They were joined in the following months
by thousands of workers from throughout the Empire, including those in
the Arsenal.87
Both the active and the recently dismissed Arsenal workers attempted
to benefit from the revolution by exerting their own collective power. On
the day that newspapers first announced the Declaration of Liberty, fifty-
six workers who had previously been dismissed appealed to the Naval
Ministry; they were reinstated the same day. However, according
to a petition they presented two weeks later, they were subsequently
discharged yet again, this time due to an alleged procedural problem.
According to the petition, this justification was a pretense, as they were
soon replaced by new ‘‘unqualified’’ workers. Although the Ministry, in
the ensuing correspondence, denied the latter allegation, it admitted that
82. BOA.ZB.439/29 and BOA.ZB.453/60.
83. BOA.ZB.16/26 and ZB.391/31. Meanwhile, children working in the rolling mill
went on strike, owing to their resentment of the director and his deputy. Immediately
after the strike, the Naval Minister ordered that both officials be replaced ‘‘immediately’’;
BOA.Y.PRK.ASK.248/103.
84. BOA.I˙.HUS.164/1326–S/12.
85. BOA.I˙.HUS.164/1326–S/16, and BOA. ZB.313/1.
86. BOA.Y.PRK.BS-K.78/99.
87. S-ehmus Gu¨zel, ‘‘Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e I˙s-c¸i Hareketleri ve Grevler’’, Tanzimat’tan
Cumhuriyet’e Tu¨rkiye Ansiklopedisi, 3 (1985), pp. 803–828, 814.
Radicalization of Arsenal Workers in the Late Ottoman Empire 423
the workers had indeed been discharged and that the remaining workers
would be dismissed gradually over the following weeks.88
The workers’ petition offers important clues about how they perceived
the new process. They welcomed the Declaration and the reinstatement of
the Constitution as a new era and a chance to return to their jobs, even as
they emphasized how they and their families had been suffering from
hunger and poverty due to being left unemployed. They also noted that
they had presented ‘‘thousands of petitions’’ to demand their jobs back.
The rhetoric employed throughout this particular petition suggests that
the workers had quickly adopted the revolutionary discourse and were
now appropriating it so as to serve their own goals:
We are humbly grateful to our Sultan and the Society of Union and Progress of
the Nation [sic] who, by divine truth, granted the liberty and justice to the
nation [when] our loyal services of thirty to forty years were trampled and [we
were] left in misery. Your worker subjects, who remained under that dark
smoke in the Era of Tyranny, today attained the shining sun of liberty and
happiness [y].
In the rest of the petition, the workers addressed the Grand Vizier,
requesting that he put an end to this situation, on the basis of ‘‘the
incompatibility of this situation to justice and liberty as endowed by the
Constitution to the noble Ottoman nation’’. The frequent use of revo-
lutionary slogans like ‘‘liberty’’ and ‘‘justice’’, the deliberate references to
the ‘‘Ottoman nation’’ and the ‘‘Constitution’’, and the depiction of the
previous era as having been ‘‘the Era of Tyranny’’ mirrored the rhetoric of
the Unionists. In short, the Declaration of Liberty opened a new space
in which they could continue their struggles against the Ottoman
authorities. The workers demonstrated that they were keenly aware of
this new reality: they took action on the first day of the revolution, and
embraced the discourse that came with it.89
88. BOA.BEO.3380/253454.
89. It is striking that in this petition the workers preferred the term is-c¸i for themselves rather
than the more common word amele. Both words had the same meaning and were used inter-
changeably in the late Ottoman Empire, but use of is-c¸i would increase, especially after the
revolution. The main reason was probably the connotations of the word amele in Turkish,
which associated the term with less skilled laborers, sometimes in a derogatory way. Indeed,
that is why at the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923, the first demand of the ‘‘Workers’ Group’’
was the replacement of amele with is-c¸i in official documents. However, this did not mean an
abrupt transition from amele to is-c¸i, as proven by another petition handed in a few weeks later,
which uses amele. Indeed, leftist organizations and publications would continue to use both
terms until the republican period. For more details on this, see Feroz Ahmad, ‘‘The Devel-
opment of Working-Class Consciousness in Turkey’’, in Zachary Lockman (ed.), Workers and
Working Classes in the Middle East: Struggles, Histories, Historiographies (Albany, NY, 1994),
pp. 133–164. Of course the scarcity of original petitions from the previous era keeps us from
making any clear-cut arguments, but this insistent use of is-c¸i in the same petition, side by side
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This rhetoric’s effectiveness seems to have fallen short in returning the
workers to their jobs, for several more collective petitions were submitted
requesting re-employment in the Arsenal. As the demands were not met,
the language of these petitions became increasingly severe against the
government. One of the petitions to the Ministry of the Interior starkly
demonstrates the extent to which these former workers had become
radicalized against the state. The petitioners implicitly and even explicitly
threatened the authorities, by forcefully emphasizing that they and their
families were ‘‘starving’’:
As your Excellency is aware, every evil stems from hunger. Theft and murder
as well are born of hunger. Please, at least until a job opens for us at the
Arsenal, give us daily bread, such that you can cut from our wages when we
begin working again. Otherwise, we will dare to seize and take the bread
coming from public bakeries in the Arsenal. For our state is our father and
mother. We are not the subjects of any other state. We are the slaves of our state
and our nation.90
Although the available documents do not show that this threat was
acted upon, the language deployed by the workers demonstrates not only
how they were able to manipulate the widely used rhetoric of ‘‘nation’’
and ‘‘state’’ on their own behalf (the press, for example, abounded with
such expressions after the revolution). It also illustrates that they were
confident that relying on their solidarity and collective power would
allow them to compel and even threaten the state. Indeed, various cor-
respondences concerning this petition reveal that officials were acutely
anxious about this sort of language. They called upon the Naval Ministry
to find and implement alternative ways to appease the workers, short of
returning them to work.91
CONCLUSION
The Revolution of 1908 was not simply a declaration enforced by
the rebellions of a small group of army officers, organized under the
Committee of Union and Progress. Immediately after the Declaration of
Liberty in July 1908, millions of people throughout the Empire trans-
formed the event into a revolution by means of their own collective
initiatives. In order to understand the revolutionary process in 1908 one
must take into account the involvement of ordinary people. It was a
with other revolutionary terminology, suggests that workers might have used the word as part
of the new vocabulary they adopted after the revolution.
90. BOA.DH.MKT.2623/3.
91. BOA.DH.MKT.1295/57, and BOA.DH.MKT.2616/21. Nevertheless, the government
continued dismissing workers, leading to strikes and other collective actions throughout the
following year. For examples, see BOA.BEO.3671/275255 and BOA.ZB.332/18.
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revolution not simply because the Sultan submitted to the demands of the
officers, but also because the collective practices of Ottoman society
claimed this historic moment for themselves and converted it into a
revolutionary process.
The question then should be pointed towards the very processes of
politicization and radicalization that allowed for immediate adoption of
the Declaration of Liberty in Ottoman society, especially among the
working classes who played a prominent role in this transformation.
One way to acknowledge the workers’ sympathy for the new regime
is to look at the preceding decades of discontent against Hamidian rule.
Further examination of this history through various other cases involving
Ottoman workers will, as this article has demonstrated, help to pinpoint
the links between class formation among Ottoman workers and the
Revolution of 1908. Such analysis will reveal the extent to which the
revolution can be described as an intersection of various processes of
class formation and radicalization against the Ottoman government.
It will, thus, facilitate more effective understanding of the class dimen-
sions of this process, which remains insufficiently considered in the
historiography of the revolution.
However, it should not be concluded from the cases discussed here that
discontent over wages was the only channel of antagonism for Ottoman
workers. As noted, future research into the everyday experiences and
non-class identities and relations of workers (i.e. ethnicity, religion, and
gender) promises to contribute valuable insights into how these identities
functioned in the Ottoman context and how they may have solidified,
cross-cut, and/or weakened class solidarity. These inquiries may also
reveal how different ideas/ideologies, including those of the Young Turks
and the Dashnaks, influenced the process of politicization against the
regime.92 The narrative above has attempted to detail how the making
of this radicalization can be identified and understood by considering
the workers’ relations with and struggles against the state. Research into
the experiences of other working-class communities in the Empire
will allow for revising the dominant narrative with regard to the revo-
lution, especially by widening the exclusive focus on the Young Turks
so as to include the central role of working classes in the history of
the revolution.
92. In fact, according to Quataert, Young Turk agitation had a primary influence on the
machine-breaking events in western Anatolia prior to the revolution; see Quataert, ‘‘Machine-
Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry’’. Young Turks, however, did not have a monopoly
on the agitation of working classes. For an examination of the role of radical leftist ideas and
networks in the collective actions of the workers in Beirut, Alexandria, and Cairo in this era, see
Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism,
1860–1914 (Berkeley, CA, 2010).
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Akın Sefer. De la solidarite´ de classe a` la re´volution: la radicalisation des
travailleurs d’arsenal dans l’empire ottoman tardif.
Cet article place dans une perspective ascendante l’histoire de la re´volution de 1908
dans l’Empire ottoman, en se concentrant sur l’expe´rience des travailleurs dans
l’Arsenal naval impe´rial (Tersaˆne-i Aˆmire) a` Istanbul. S’inspirant principalement de
documents fondamentaux, il examine les luttes et les relations des travailleurs de
l’Arsenal de la seconde moitie´ du dix-neuvie`me sie`cle a` la re´volution, dans la
perspective d’une formation de classe. L’intervention des travailleurs de l’Arsenal
dans la re´volution s’enracina dans leur solidarite´ de classe qui se re´ve´la de diffe´-
rentes fac¸ons tout au long de cette pe´riode. Ce qui incita les travailleurs a` embrasser
imme´diatement la re´volution fut leur radicalisation contre l’E´tat qui manquait a`
re´soudre leurs proble`mes e´conomiques persistants et tentait de les renvoyer et
remplacer par de la main-d’œuvre militaire. Le cas des travailleurs de l’arsenal
souligne donc le roˆle du me´contentement des classes ouvrie`res dans l’histoire de la
re´volution, dimension qui e´tait reste´e inexplore´e dans l’historiographie ottomane.
Traduction: Christine Kra¨tke-Plard
Akın Sefer. Von der Klassensolidarita¨t zur Revolution: Die Radikalisierung der
Zeughausarbeiter im spa¨ten osmanischen Reich
Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Geschichte der 1908 im osmanischen Reich ausge-
brochenen Revolution ‘‘von unten’’, indem er sich auf die Erfahrungen der Arbeiter
in den osmanischen Marine-Zeugha¨usern (Tersaˆne-i Aˆmire) in Istanbul konzen-
triert. Es wird u¨berwiegend auf Prima¨rquellen zuru¨ckgegriffen, um die Ka¨mpfe
und Verha¨ltnisse der Zeughausarbeiter zwischen der zweiten Ha¨lfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts und bis zur Revolution aus der Perspektive der Klassenformierung zu
untersuchen. Die Beteiligung der Zeughausarbeiter an der Revolution war in ihrer
Klassensolidarita¨t verwurzelt, die in diesem Zeitraum auf vielfa¨ltige Weise zum
Ausdruck kam. Was die Zeughausarbeiter veranlasste, die Revolution sofort zu
begru¨ßen, war ihre Radikalisierung gegenu¨ber dem Staat, der nicht in der Lage war,
ihre anhaltenden wirtschaftlichen Probleme zu lo¨sen und der versuchte, sie zu
entlassen und durch milita¨rische Arbeitskra¨fte zu ersetzen. Der Fall der Zeug-
hausarbeiter verweist also auf die Rolle, die die Unzufriedenheit der Arbeiter
innerhalb der Revolution gespielt hat: ein Aspekt, der in der Historiografie des
osmanischen Reiches bislang unterbelichtet geblieben ist.
U¨bersetzung: Max Henninger
Akın Sefer. De la solidaridad de clase a la revolucio´n: la radicalizacio´n de los
trabajadores de los arsenales al final del Imperio Otoman
Este artı´culo plantea una perspectiva desde debajo de la historia de la Revolucio´n
de 1908 en el Imperio Otomano centra´ndose principalmente en las experiencias de
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los trabajadores del Arsenal Naval Imperial (Tersaˆne-i Aˆmire) en Estambul.
Sustenta´ndose fundamentalmente en fuentes primarias explora las luchas y las
relaciones de los trabajadores del arsenal desde la segunda mitad del siglo XIX
hasta la Revolucio´n desde una perspectiva de formacio´n de clase. La implicacio´n de
los trabajadores del arsenal en la Revolucio´n tiene su arraigo en la solidaridad de
clase que se hizo patente de muy diferentes formas a lo largo de este periodo.
Lo que les empujo´ a participar de forma temprana en la Revolucio´n fue su radi-
calizacio´n contra el Estado que fracasaba a la hora de resolver sus problemas
econo´micos persistentes e intentaba despedirles y reemplazarles por mano de obra
procedente del estamento militar. El caso de los trabajadores del arsenal apunta al
papel del descontento de la clase obrera en la historia de la Revolucio´n, una
dimensio´n que ha sido poco estudiada en la historiografı´a otomana.
Traduccio´n: Vicent Sanz Rozale´n
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